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A Bill of Rights for South Africa?
Introduction
There is a new openness in South Africa since Mr. F. W. de Klerk
became President of South Africa in September 1989. The National
Party government has released prominent political prisoners, including
Nelson Mandela; it has lifted the bans on the African National Congress
("ANC"), the Pan-Africanist Congress ("PAC"), the South African Com-
munist Party, and other radical political organizations; and the govern-
ment has called for negotiations between itself and all other political
groupings, particularly the ANC, to create "a totally new and just consti-
tutional dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights,
treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavour-constitu-
tional, social and economic."' Despite these positive developments,
South Africa remains a principal human rights violator. Its statute book
is stained with a number of racist and repressive laws that violate
accepted human rights norms. The new, more open political climate has
fostered intensified demands to repeal these laws and to adopt legal
machinery that would protect human rights. The government of South
Africa is currently considering methods to protect individual freedoms
in this notoriously repressive political system. To this end, a govern-
ment-appointed agency has proposed a bill of rights to resolve South
Africa's human rights problems.
The proposed bill of rights has generated a lively debate on the
nature of human rights in South Africa and the extent of protection for
those rights. This Article will examine that debate and its likely out-
come. Part I examines the political and societal context in which that
debate occurs, focusing on South Africa's current constitutional struc-
ture and the law of apartheid. Part II presents the historical foundations
of the current human rights debate. It also presents the South African
Law Commission's proposed bill of rights as well as the African National
Congress's proposal for a new constitutional order. Finally, Part III ana-
lyzes the Law Commission's proposals regarding the most controversial
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1. DEBATES OF PARLIAMENT (Hansard) col. 2 (Feb. 2, 1990) (2d session, 9th
Parliament).
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rights to be granted, critiquing the appropriateness of those proposals
for the current South African situation.
I. The Political and Social Structure of South Africa
A. South Africa's Constitutional Structure: Parliamentary
Sovereignty
Since the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the central
principle in its constitutional law has been the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, and by necessary extension, judicial subordination to the
will of Parliament.
In 1910, the British Parliament enacted South Africa's first constitu-
tion, creating a union of four British colonies: the Cape of Good Hope,
Natal, Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony.2 Modeled after the
unwritten Westminister Constitution, the first constitution contained no
bill of rights and did not expressly provide for judicial review of acts of
Parliament. When the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
South Africa began questioning the constitutionality of lawmaking pro-
cedures,5 Parliament amended the 1910 constitution to expressly
exclude the power of the court "to enquire into or to pronounce upon
the validity of any law passed by Parliament,"' 4 leaving no doubt as to
the complete supremacy of Parliament.
When South Africa became a republic in 1961, it adopted a new
constitution but as in its predecessor, this constitution also prohibited
judicial review of Parliamentary acts. 5 In 1983, the present constitution
was enacted. 6 Although this constitution departs from the Westminister
tradition by creating an executive President, three legislative chambers,
and a special President's Council for resolving inter-chamber conflicts, it
fails to provide legal protection for human rights or to recognize the
power of judicial review. Again, the constitution prohibits courts from
questioning the validity of acts of Parliament.7
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty cannot be justified in
South Africa as it is in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom justi-
fies its constitutional structure on the ground that the will of the people
is expressed through the acts of a fully representative Parliament.
2. For an account of the creation of this constitution, see L. THOMPSON, THE
UNIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1902-10 (1960).
3. Harris v. Minister of the Interior, 1952 (2) S. African L. Rep. 428 (App. Div.).
For a further discussion of the confrontation between courts and Parliament, see J.
DUGARD, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 28-34 (1978).
4. South Africa Act Amendment Act, No. 9 of 1956, § 2, STATUTES OF THE UNION
OF SOUTH AFRICA 29 (1956) [hereinafter STAT. UN. S. AFR.].
5. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 32 of 1961, § 59(2), STAT. UN.
S. AFr. 346, 382 (1961).
6. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 of 1983, STATUTES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA - CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 1301 (Butterworths) [main series
hereinafter STAT. REPUB. S. AFR.J.
7. Id. § 34(3).
Vol 23
1990 Bill of Rights for South Africa
Therefore, it would be improper for the courts to judicially review acts
of Parliament that reflect the will of the people.
The South African constitutional structure cannot be justified by
this argument because the Parliament represents a minority of the peo-
ple. The 1910 constitution initially provided for a non-racial franchise
in one of the four provinces,8 but it was later amended to ensure that
Parliament consisted solely of white legislators, chosen by an all-white
electorate.9 The 1961 constitution limited the franchise to whites only.
The 1983 constitution creates a tricameral system that vests all power in
a white House of Assembly and gives token representation to
"coloreds"' 0 and Indians" in two separate chambers. The African peo-
ple, who comprise seventy percent of the country's population, are com-
pletely excluded from this constitutional compact; they may exercise
their political "rights" in ten ethnic legislatures in "independent" or
self-governing homelands or Bantustans. 2
Parliamentary supremacy in South Africa, therefore, is simply a pre-
text for white constitutional domination of a disenfranchised black
majority. A white-controlled Parliament is empowered to enact any leg-
islation it deems fit for the unrepresented black majority, without the
restraints associated with a bill of rights or judicial review.
B. The Law of Apartheid
Although discrimination and political repression previously existed in
South Africa, apartheid did not become established until 1948. In that
year, the National Party came to power on the platform of apartheid,
requiring complete segregation between white and black' 3 in every
aspect of life. In its first decade of rule, the National Party enacted laws
that disenfranchised the remaining colored voters, 14 classified the popu-
lation along racial lines, 15 provided for segregation, promoted inequal-
ity in human relations, 16 work, 17 social life,' 8 education,' 9 and
8. The Cape Province was the only province with a non-racial franchise.
9. See J. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 29-31.
10. In South Africa, the term "coloreds" refers to persons of mixed descent. The
"colored" chamber created by the 1983 constitution is known as the House of
Representatives.
11. The Indian chamber of the tricameral system is the House of Delegates.
12. For a description of this legislative structure, see Dugard, South Africa's
"Independent" Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization, 10 DEN.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 11
(1980).
13. "Black" refers to the entire non-white population of South Africa, specifically
African, colored, and Indian peoples. "Non-white" is rejected as a pejorative term.
The government, however, persists in using the term "black" to refer to Africans
only. Previously, the government used the term "Bantu" to describe the African
people.
14. SeeJ. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 29-31.
15. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, STAT. UN. S. AYa. 275 (1950).
See also J. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 59-63.
16. The government enacted laws to prohibit inter-racial marriages and extra-
marital sexual relations between persons of different races. Immorality Act, No. 23
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housing,20 and restricted black migration from impoverished rural areas
to industrialized cities with greater employment opportunities. 21
After establishing this legislative foundation, Parliament exercised
its authority for two purposes. First, it enacted repressive security laws.
To further this purpose, it abandoned habeas corpus, allowed indefinite
detention of prisoners without trial, and suppressed political expres-
sion.22 Second, Parliament created homelands or Bantustan structures
to appease black political aspirations. By creating these independent
Bantustans, Parliament effectively denationalized over seven million black
South Africans. 23
This legislatively-created structure premised on race discrimination
and political repression constitutes the law of apartheid. This legal
order has been reviled and repudiated by the modem nations of the
world and has prompted the United Nations24 and several individual
states2 5 to apply sanctions against South Africa.
In recent years, the National Party government has embarked upon
a policy of reform. The government has repealed the laws prohibiting
inter-racial marriage and sexual relations26 and has abolished the noto-
rious influx control or "pass laws" that made it a crime for blacks to visit
a "white" area without a permit or "pass." '27 In the labor area, the gov-
ernment has abandoned the practice of reserving certain jobs for whites
and has allowed blacks the right of collective bargaining by recognizing
black trade unions.28 Students of all races are now allowed to attend
of 1957, § 16, STAT. UN. S. AFR. 276 (1957); Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No.
55 of 1949, STAT. UN. S. AFR. 614 (1949). See alsoJ. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 68-71.
17. A number of statutes reserved certain jobs for whites only. See J. DuGARD,
supra note 3, at 86-89.
18. Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1953, STAT. UN. S. AFR. 328
(1953). SeeJ. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 63-68.
19. South African schools have traditionally been segregated. However, in 1953,
the government assumed responsibility for all African education and proceeded to
create an inferior form of education for Africans. See Bantu Education Act, No. 47 of
1953, STAT. UN. S. Au. 258 (1953). See also J. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 83-85.
20. Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950, STAT. UN. S. APR. 407 (1950) (introducing
residential segregation). See also J. DuGARD, supra note 3, at 79-83.
21. These influx control laws were known as "pass laws." See J. DUGARD, supra
note 3, at 75.
22. Id at 110-23, 155-67.
23. See Dugard, supra note 12, at 27.
24. In 1977, the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against
South Africa. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCRD (Resolutions and Decisions of the Secur-
ity Council) at 5 (1977). Resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security
Council have recommended a wide variety of sanctions against South Africa.
25. See, e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5001 (West Supp.
1986).
26. Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Amendment Act, No. 72 of
1985, STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. - CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 631 (Butterworths).
27. Abolition of Influx Control Act, No. 68 of 1986, STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. -
BLACKs 3235 (Butterworths). While in force, the pass laws resulted in the jailing of
thousands of blacks who had visited "white" areas usually in search of work.
28. Labour Relations Amendment Act, No. 57 of 1981, STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. -
LABOUR 603 (Butterworths).
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universities. 29 Sports, hotels, restaurants, libraries, parks, transporta-
tion facilities, and most public amenities have been desegregated. South
Africa of 1990 is therefore no longer the rigidly segregated society that
it once was.
Although these reforms are important, the stain of statutory segre-
gation remains, and race discrimination with the approval of law still
characterizes South African society. Race classification laws continue to
divide the South African population along racial lines.5 0 Although it has
been relaxed in practice, the Group Areas Act,3 1 which provides for resi-
dential segregation, remains in force. Separate and unequal schooling
still enjoys the force of law. Blacks may own land in only thirteen per-
cent of the country.5 2 Although some blacks have regained their South
African nationality,3 3 the majority of those denationalized in furtherance
of Bantustan independence remain without their South African national-
ity. Moreover, the government continues to denationalize blacks as it
territorially expands the Bantustans. Politically, the African population
remains disenfranchised, while the colored and Indian communities
enjoy only a semblance of representation in the new tricameral
Parliament.
The racial reforms have been accompanied by intensified political
repression. The drastic security laws that terrorized political opposition
for over thirty years remain in force. Moreover, in 1985, the govern-
ment declared a state of emergency3 4 and promulgated emergency reg-
ulations that now give the security forces wide powers to detain
prisoners without trial, prohibit political meetings, proscribe political
organizations, and restrict the media.
Thus, during the past forty years, apartheid has undergone impor-
tant changes in response to internal and external pressures. Neverthe-
less, despite the racial reforms of the mid-1980s, South Africa remains a
racist and repressive society whose laws and practices constitute a con-
sistent pattern of gross violation of human rights.
29. Universities Amendment Act, No. 83 of 1983, STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. - EDUCA-
rION 41 (Butterworths).
30. Identification Act, No. 72 of 1986, STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. - CENSUS AND STATIS-
-rcs 341 (Butterworths) (current law segregating South African society).
31. Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966, STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. - GROUP AREAS 121
(Butterworths).
32. See Robertson, Black Land Tenure: Disabilities and Some Rights, in RACE AND THE
LAW IN SotrrH AFRICA 119 (A. Rycroft, M. Robertson & P. Spiller eds. 1987).
33. Restoration of South African Citizenship Act, No. 73 of 1986, STAT. REPUB. S.
Ant. - ALIENS AND CITIZENs 261 (Butterworths). For discussion of the limited scope
of this law, see Rycroft, Citizenship and Rights, in RACE AND THE LAW IN Sotrra AFRICA,
supra note 32, at 209.
34. Public Safety Act, No. 3 of 1953, STAT. REPUB. S. AFR. - CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 191 (Butterworths). This emergency has been annually renewed since
1985.
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II. The History of the Bill of Rights Debate
A. Historical Foundations of the Current Debate
South African common law is Roman-Dutch law, derived from ancient
Roman law as adapted by the Netherlands during the 17th and 18th
centuries.35
As the guiding philosophy of Roman-Dutch law is natural law,3 6 it
might have logically produced a legal order in South Africa premised
upon the rights of man and judicial review.3 7 Traces of the natural law
tradition can be found in the 1854 constitution of the Orange Free
State, one of the Boer republics, which guaranteed certain individual
rights and recognized the power ofjudicial review of legislation.38 The
constitution of the other Boer Republic, the South African Republic
(Transvaal), did not expressly provide for judicial review, but in 1896
the Chief Justice held that the constitution created a "higher law" and
set aside legislation that violated its prescriptions.3 9
A number of factors ensured that the original South African consti-
tution of 1910 did not include a bill of rights. First, English constitu-
tionalism, which regarded constitutional guarantees as unnecessary, was
a pervasive influence. Second, when Chief Justice Kotze exercised the
testing power in the South African Republic, it precipitated a major
political crisis that resulted in the dismissal of the ChiefJustice and led
President Kruger to label the testing power "a principle of the devil"
introduced into paradise to test God's word.40 Third, there was a dis-
tinct distrust of the United States constitutional model, which was
blamed for the U.S. Civil War.4 1
Following World War II, South Africa refused to join the worldwide
trend toward a renewed interest in human rights. For example, it
refused to endorse the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948.42 However, as the policy of apartheid began to unfold, opponents
of apartheid attempted to place human rights on the political agenda. In
1955, the Congress Alliance convened and adopted a Freedom Char-
35. The Dutch introduced Roman-Dutch law to South Africa when they colonized
the Cape in 1652. South Africa retained this system of law after the British occupa-
tion in 1806.
36. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the "father of international law," was a Dutchman
who wrote extensively on Roman-Dutch law. See GROTtoS READER 5 (L. von Holk &
C. Rolofsen eds. 1983). His adherence to natural law had a lasting influence on
Roman-Dutch law.
37. In contrast to South Africa, the natural law tradition in the United States led
to the adoption of a bill of rights protected by judicial review. See, e.g., Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 165
(1928/29).
38. See Thompson, Constitutionalism in the South African Republics, BurrERWORTHs S.
AmR. L. REv. 49, 52-53, 55 (1954).
39. Brown v. Leyds N.O., 1897 (4) Off. Rep. 17.
40. SeeJ. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 24.
41. See L. THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 103-04, 187.
42. South Africa, together with the Soviet bloc and Saudi Arabia, abstained from
voting on the Declaration.
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ter.43 This document, which remains a manifesto of the liberation strug-
gle, was "amongst the most advanced documents of its time, spelling
out in clear and coherent language, economic and social rights that were
only to become internationally agreed upon in the 1960's and people's
rights that were only to be formulated in the 1970's and 1980's." 44
In 1960, the liberal Progressive Party promulgated a more orthodox
proposal for a bill of rights aimed at the protection of principal civil and
political rights. 45 However, in 1961, the National Party government
outrightly dismissed attempts to have a bill of rights introduced into the
1961 republican constitution. 4 6
In the 1960s and 1970s, the National Party government passed
repressive security laws that authorized indefinite detention without
trial. Thousands were detained, many were tortured, and some fifty
detainees died in the most suspicious circumstances. 47 In response to
these human rights violations, many prominent political, academic, and
judicial South Africans demanded constitutional protection of human
rights.48 However, when the constitutional committee of the President's
Council, which was charged with the task of constitutional planning, met
in 1982, it rejected proposals for a bill of rights. The committee rea-
soned that a bill of rights emphasized individual rights and the
"Afrikaner with his Calvinist background is more inclined to place the
emphasis on the state and the maintenance of the state."'4 9 Conse-
quently, the 1983 constitution contains no guarantee for personal
liberty.5 0
Despite this setback, support for a South African bill of rights con-
tinued to grow. During a regional conference in Natal, the principal
black and white politicians proposed the adoption of a bill of rights for
that province, 51 and in 1985, the South African government itself
43. The Freedom Charter, June 26, 1955 (adopted at Kliptown, Transvaal),
reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGrrs IN AFRICA: BASIC DOCUMENTS
AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIY 99 (M. Hamalengwa, C. Flinterman & E. Donkwa
comps. 1988). For an interesting account of The Congress of the People and The
adoption of the Freedom Charter, see G. MARCUS, THE FREEDOM CHARTER: A
BLUEPRINT FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA (Centre for Applied Studies, University
of the Witwatersrand, Occasional Paper No. 9, 1985). The African National Con-
gress played a dominant role in the Congress Alliance.
44. A. SACHS, TowARDS A BILL OF RIGHTS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA 13
(Draft Discussion Paper 1988).
45. SeeJ. DuGARD, supra note 3, at 34.
46. Id at 34-35.
47. The most notable case was that of Steve Biko who died while in police custody
in 1977.
48. In 1979, ChiefJustice M. M. Corbett, who was then a senior judge of appeal,
added his influential voice to the appeal for a bill of rights. See Corbett, Human
Rights: The Road Ahead, 96 S. AsR. L.J. 192, 201 (1979).
49. President's Council Second Report, PC4/1982, ch. 9, para. 10.1.
50. See 108 HANsARD cols. 11181-494 (Aug. 15-17, 1983) (House of Assembly
debate strongly rejecting an opposition proposal to include a bill of rights in the
Constitution Bill).
51. See Leon, New Hope for Natak An Examination of the Kwa Zulu Natal Indaba's Bill
of Rights, 19 REALITY 7 (1987).
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enacted a declaration of rights for Namibia. 52
But in 1985 the prospect of a South African bill of rights again
seemed remote when the National Party government declared a state of
emergency and introduced new arbitrary police powers to cope with the
"unrest" that resulted from the enactment of the 1983 constitution. On
April 23, 1986, with no explanation, the Minister of Justice, Mr. J. H.
Coetsee, announced in Parliament that he had requested the South Afri-
can Law Commission to investigate the role of the courts in protecting
group and individual rights and to consider the desirability of instituting
a bill of rights.53 Mr. Coetsee gave no explanation for this sudden about
face. Was it because the government had genuinely changed its attitude
towards human rights? Or perhaps the government realized that a bill
of rights might serve to protect whites, and particularly Afrikaners,
against a future black government? Or it might have been an effort to
forestall the U.S. Congress from adopting sanctions against South Africa
by sending a belated signal that South Africa was prepared to model
itself upon the U.S. Constitution in order to promote human rights.54
Whatever the explanation, the Minister's announcement set in motion a
debate over the legal protection of human rights that continues to grow
today.
B. The Report of the South African Law Commission
The South African Law Commission5 5 consists of seven members
appointed by the State President. It is chaired by a senior judge of
appeal, Mr. Justice H. J. 0. van Heerden. Mr. Justice P. J. J. Olivier has
been seconded from the bench to direct the work of the Commission.
Other members of the Commission include experienced practicing law-
yers and an academic lawyer. All of its members are white males.
The Commission, which is empowered to "make recommendations
for the development, improvement, modernization or reform"5 6 of the
law, had previously confined its work largely to non-controversial, politi-
cally neutral areas of the common law. The Minister ofJustice's direc-
tive to study the desirability of a South African bill of rights constituted a
new departure for the Law Commission.
Because the National Party government has historically been hostile
to individual rights, its instruction that the Commission report on a bill
of rights inevitably led to suspicion and cynicism regarding both the
52. Establishment and Powers of Legislative and Executive Authority for Terri-
tory of South West Africa, R. 101, 240 Gov'T GAzEzrr No. 9790 (une 17, 1985),
amend by Amendment of Proclamation, R. 101 of 1985, R. 157, 255 GOV'T GAZErrE
No. 10418 (Sept. 5, 1986).
53. 8 HANSARD cols. 4014-15 (April 23, 1986) (statement of Mr. Coetsee in the
House of Assembly).
54. The author personally prefers this last explanation.
55. South African Law Commission Act, No. 19 of 1973, STAT. RPuB. S. AFR. -
CowS rtmoNAL LAW 901 (Butterworths) (governing the establishment and opera-
tion of the Commission).
56. Id. § 4, at 903.
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motives for the study and its likely outcome. Many believed that the Law
Commission would produce a report that exalted group rights, and by
necessary implication Afrikaner group rights, over individual rights. In
addition, many radical opponents of the government harbored misgiv-
ings about the legitimacy of the Law Commission itself. For these rea-
sons, many lawyers, particularly lawyers in the black community,
declined to make representations to the Law Commission.
After receiving evidence and researching the topic, the Law Com-
mission produced a Working Paper on Group and Human Rights (the "Work-
ing Paper")5 7 in March 1989. The Working Paper examines the philosophy
of human rights, international and foreign methods of protecting human
rights, current South African attitudes towards human rights, and the
nature of the rights to be protected. It concludes with a draft bill of
rights5 8 and a discussion of various methods for implementing such an
instrument.
The draft bill of rights focuses on individual rights and endorses the
basic civil and political rights found in most international instruments
and bills of rights. It proclaims the rights to life (but fails to outlaw
capital punishment), liberty, privacy, and a fair trial; it guarantees the
freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and movement; and it con-
demns torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The draft
bill recognizes equality before the law and outlaws discrimination based
on race or gender. Most importantly, the draft bill asserts "[t]he right of
all citizens over the age of eighteen years to exercise the vote on a basis
of equality in respect of all legislative institutions at regular and periodi-
cal elections and at referendums." 59 The draft bill does not include
socio-economic rights such as the right to work, to holidays, to proper
pay, to favorable working conditions, and to education.60 The Commis-
sion reasoned that such rights are non-justiciable and therefore belong
to a political manifesto rather than a bill of rights.
The bill does not provide for group rights on the ground that South
African law is "oriented towards the individual" and "does not recog-
nize the legal subjectivity of an amorphous group such as, for example, a
racial group, an ethnic group, [or] a cultural group .... -"61 On the other
hand, cultural, religious, and linguistic rights attaching to particular
groups are protected through the guarantee of individual rights.
Although the bill does not directly protect group rights, it gives limited
57. SoUTH AFRiC:AN LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER 25, Project 58: Group and
Human Rights (Aug. 31, 1989) [hereinafter WORKING PAPER]. The WORKING PAPER
is popularly known as the Olivier Report because the dominant figure in its compila-
tion was Mr. Justice Olivier.
58. The Draft Bill of Rights is found in chapter 15.
59. Id, art. 20, at 474.
60. Compare International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Annex to G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966) with Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 23-26, G.A. Res. 217
(III), 3(1) U.N. GAOR (183d plen. mtg.) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
61. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, at 383.
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protection through a provision recognizing "[t]he right of every person
or group to disassociate himself or itself from other individuals or
groups ... 62 Where such disassociation results in racial, religious,
linguistic, or cultural discrimination, however, no public funds shall be
allocated to such an enterprise. The provision clearly anticipates racially
exclusive private schools with no public financing.
The proposed rights in this bill may be derogated to preserve state
security or other public interests, "but only in such measure and in such
a manner as is acceptable in a democratic society."' 68 The existing divi-
sions of the Supreme Court6 are granted the power of judicial review
and may set aside any legislative or administrative act that violates any of
the rights contained in the bill. 65
The Law Commission's draft bill is not intended as a final state-
ment, but as a working paper designed to elicit comment.
C. The ANC's Constitutional Guidelines
In 1988, the ANC, which was outlawed in South Africa from 1960 until
February 2, 1990, published the Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic
South Africa66 (the "Guidelines") from its headquarters in exile, Lusaka,
Zambia. Like the Working Paper, the Guidelines were issued to encourage
national debate on the form that a post-apartheid society should take.
The Guidelines pay homage to the 1955 Freedom Charter and
declare that the Charter "must be converted from a vision for the future
into a constitutional reality."' 67 According to the Guidelines:
The constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom
Charter. Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human
rights of all citizens irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed and shall
provide appropriate mechanisms for their enforcement.68
Nothing further is said about the "mechanisms for enforcement." This
is probably due to the debate within the ANC itself as to whether the
courts or a special commission answerable to Parliament would be best
suited to monitor a bill of rights.
The Guidelines guarantee freedom of association, expression,
62. Id. art. 17, at 474.
63. Id art. 30, at 479.
64. The Supreme Court of South Africa comprises nine regional divisions and an
appellate division. There are some 130 Supreme Court judges in the country. SeeJ.
DuGARD, supra note 3, at 10-11.
65. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 31, at 479.
66. AFRIcAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, CONsTrr"noNAL GUIDELINES FOR A DEMO-
cRATic SoUTH AFRIcA, reprinted in 5 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 129 (1989) [hereinafter CON-
STITUTIONAL GUIDELINES]. For discussions of this document, see Nagan, Law and
Post-Apartheid SouthAfrica, 12 FoRDnmu INT'L L.J. 399 (1989); van der Vyver, Comments
on the Constitutional Guidelines of the African National Congress, 5 S. AFR.J. HuM. RTS. 133
(1989).
67. CONsTrrrTiONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 66, at 129.
68. Id para. h, at 131.
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thought, worship, and the press.6 9 These freedoms are, however, sub-
ject to the qualification that the "advocacy or practice of racism, fascism,
naziism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred
shall be outlawed." 70
In contrast to the Law Commission's draft bill of rights, the Guide-
lines guarantee social and economic rights. The state would be obliged
to protect the right to work, to guarantee education and social secur-
ity,7 1 and "to take active steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and
social inequalities produced by racial discrimination." '7 2 A Workers'
Charter, protecting the right to strike and collective bargaining, is to be
incorporated into the constitution.7 3 The Guidelines provide for affirma-
tive action to redress past inequalities based on both race and gender.
The Guidelines denounce the constitutional protection of group
rights because such protection would perpetuate the status quo'7 while
simultaneously declaring that "the state shall recognise the linguistic
and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguis-
tic and cultural development." '7 5
M. The Current Debate Over a Bill of Rights
The National Party government's response to the South African Law
Commission's proposed bill of rights has been equivocal. While the
government accepts the need to protect individual rights, there are signs
that it is dissatisfied with the Law Commission's refusal to accord equal
status to the protection of group rights. President de Klerk's opening
address to Parliament on February 2, 1990 evidenced this equivocation:
The Government accepts the principle of the recognition and protection
of the fundamental individual rights which form the constitutional basis
of most Western democracies. We acknowledge, too, that the most prac-
tical way of protecting those rights is vested in a declaration of rights jus-
tifiable by an independent judiciary.
However, it is clear that a system for the protection of the rights of indi-
viduals, minorities and national entities has to form a well-rounded and
balanced whole. South Africa has its own national composition, and our
constitutional dispensation has to take this into account. The formal rec-
ognition of individual rights does not mean that the problems of a hetero-
geneous population will simply disappear. Any new constitution which
disregards this reality will be inappropriate and even harmful.
Naturally, the protection of collective, minority and national rights may
not bring about an imbalance in respect of individual rights. It is neither
the Government's policy nor its intention that any group - in whichever
way it may be defined - shall be favoured over or in relation to any of the
69. Id para. 1.
70. Id para. k.
71. Id. para. 1.
72. Id. para. j.
73. Id para. v, at 132.
74. Id at 130 (prefatory note).
75. Id. para. g, at 131.
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The ANC's attitude towards a bill of rights is likewise equivocal.
While the Guidelines indicate support for a bill of rights, it is not clear
whether the ANC is prepared to accept the principle ofjudicial review as
a necessary component of a bill of rights. The response of other polit-
ical groups has been more explicit. Predictably, the right-wing white
Conservative Party has rejected the draft bill because it fails to explicitly
protect group rights. The Democratic Party, which is the liberal white
opposition party, has indicated its full support for a bill of rights along
the lines of the draft. bill.
While the various political groups have .expressed themselves on
the issue of a South African bill of rights, the main debate occurs among
lawyers, academics, 77 church and community leaders, and the business
sector. Judge Olivier continues to play a major role in this debate, as the
Law Commission is presently considering comments on its Working Paper
upon which another report and revised bill will be based. Because many
disputed areas remain unresolved, it seems unlikely that this final report
will be completed within the next year. In addition, because the intro-
duction of a bill of rights is closely linked with constitutional reform, a
subject that is only now receiving serious attention, there is no sense of
urgency to resolve the debate. But the fact that the debate over a bill of
rights has preceded the debate over constitutional options indicates that
the protection of human rights will feature prominently in any new
South African constitution.
The remainder of this Article will focus on the major areas of con-
troversy within the bill of rights debate. In addition, the author will
offer his own views as to the most popular and efficacious resolutions to
the controversies discussed.
A. Drafting the Bill of Rights
In the Working Paper, the South African Law Commission identifies two
types of bills of rights: those couched in broad, general terms, such as
the U.S. Bill of Rights, and those written in "precise, legalistic terms,
such as those drawn up by the British colonial authorities for their for-
mer colonies .... -"78 The Commission chose the former model because
the judiciary may more easily adapt this type to unforeseen circum-
stances, as illustrated by the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. 79
Although the Law Commission places the European Convention on
76. DEBATES OF PARLAMENT (Hansard) col. 6 (Feb. 2, 1990) (2d session, 9th
Parliament).
77. There is a growing body of literature on the Olivier Report. See, e.g., van der
Vyver, The South Afiican Law Commission's Provisional Report on Group and Human Rights,
106 S. AmucAN L.J. 536 (1989).
78. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, at 411. For examples of such "precise, legal-
istic" bills of rights, see BAxmAnos CONST. ch. III; BOTSWANA CONST. ch. II.
79. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, at 412.
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Human Rights8 ° in the same category as the U.S. Bill of Rights, this
analysis is not correct. The European Convention on Human Rights
and other international human rights conventions formulate a more spe-
cific catalogue of rights and qualifications on those rights than the U.S.
document. Moreover, while it is true that the U.S. Bill of Rights has
been creatively adapted to new situations, one must recall that this judi-
cial creativity has often resulted in major political controversy.8 1 A bill
of rights that charts a middle course between the Scylla of liberal gener-
alization and the Charybdis of restrictive precision would allow the judi-
ciary to develop the law in a dynamic manner without becoming overly
political.8 2 Furthermore, a post-apartheid South Africa will presumably
wish to accede to a number of international human rights instruments in
order to demonstrate its new commitment to human rights.88 A bill of
rights that models itself on these conventions will facilitate the process
of accession by bringing South African domestic law into line with the
international obligations imposed upon signatories to these instru-
ments. Therefore, the European Convention on Human Rights offers a
better model for South Africa than the U.S. Bill of Rights.
B. Affirmative Action
In the U.S., the Supreme Court has approved a policy of affirmative
action to redress the historical injustices meted out to minority groups
and women.8 4 The legacy of racial injustice in South Africa not only
runs deeper, but has affected the majority rather than the minority.
Therefore, the need for redress through the use of affirmative action is
much greater in South Africa than it is in the U.S.
Affirmative action is a controversial issue in contemporary South
Africa. The civil service has retained its predominantly white character
and maintains its policy of favoring Afrikaners for both employment and
advancement. The business community and some universities, on the
80. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
81. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). See generally P. MURPHY, THE CON-
sTrruriON IN C~isis TIMEs 1918-1969 (1972).
82. This conclusion is supported by the fact that when Canada adopted its Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, it followed the example of the interna-
tional human rights conventions. See Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, sch. B, pt. I, 1980-8 1-
82-83 Can. Stat. V [hereinafter Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms].
83. For example, a post-apartheid South Africa would probably wish to join the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
openedfor signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
84. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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other hand, already practice affirmative action on a voluntary basis. 85
They have studied the U.S. experience with affirmative action and have
modeled their own programs on this example. Thus, South African
whites, at least those outside the civil service, are probably more pre-
pared for affirmative action than the U.S. was when it first embarked
upon this course.
Clearly affirmative action will have a major political role to play in a
post-apartheid South Africa. It would be unacceptable to place unrea-
sonable restraints on this process by insisting on an equality-before-the-
law provision in a bill of rights. Opinions differ, however, as to what is
envisaged by affirmative action. Will it merely take the form of rectifica-
tion in the fields of education and employment, or will it be used to
embark on a radical program of redistribution of land and wealth?
While the former can be recognized in a traditional bill of rights, it will
be difficult to take account of the latter in such an instrument.
The Law Commission approaches affirmative action cautiously and
considers it in the context of advancing disadvantaged minorities in the
education and employment fields. The Law Commission finds that
affirmative action "is recognized in international law as being non-dis-
criminatory, so long as it is temporary and is not enforced against the will of
the minority."8 6 It goes on to say that the legislature should be permitted
"to make certain laws to grant a minority group which has been discrimi-
nated against certain advantages temporarily with the object of achiev-
ing equality .... ,,87 The draft bill qualifies the requirement of equality
before the law with the proviso that legislation shall be permissible "on
a temporary basis" for the purpose of improving the position of persons
or groups who find themselves to be disadvantaged "for historical rea-
sons."8 8 But in South Africa it is not a minority that requires redress of
historical injustices, as the Law Commission suggests, but rather a
majority comprising seventy percent of the population. Albie Sachs, an
exiled South African lawyer at the forefront of ANC constitutional plan-
ning, states:
It is not just individuals who will be looking to the Bill of Rights as a
means of enlarging their freedoms and improving the quality of their
lives, but whole communities, especially those whose rights have been
systematically and relentlessly denied by the apartheid system. If a Bill of
Rights is seen as a truly creative document that requires and facilitates the
85. The experience of the School of Law of the University of the Witwatersrand
indicates the extent of this voluntary affirmative action. In 1980, the students in the
School of Law consisted of 84.55% whites, 3.5% Africans, 1.3% colored, and 10.7%
Asians. By 1990, the student body in the School of Law consisted of 63% whites,
28% Africans, 2% coloreds, and 7% Asians.
86. WORaNG PAPER, supra note 57, at 440 (emphasis added).
87. Id (entire quotation emphasized in original).
88. lad art. 2, at 471. This article echoes provisions in several other documents.
See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 82, § 15(2); INDIA CONST.
§§ 15(4), 16(4), 335; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, supra note 83, art. 1(4), at 216.
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achievement of the rights so long denied to the great majority of the peo-
ple, it must have an appropriate corrective strategy. 89
Sachs correctly claims that the need for corrective measures is not
solely confined to education and employment as the Law Commission
suggests. He argues that the necessary "corrective strategy" must be
directed at every aspect of South African society, including "the restora-
tion of land, wealth and dignity to the people... ."90 Although not
explicit on this subject, the ANC's Guidelines also contemplate a much
wider form of affirmative action than that practiced in the U.S. and
accepted by the Law Commission. The Guidelines require the state "to
take active steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequali-
ties produced by racial discrimination" 9 1 and to implement land reforms
"in conformity with the principle of Affirmative Action." 92
C. Freedom of Speech
The U.S. Bill of Rights, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, adopts a
libertarian approach to free speech that tolerates even the most offen-
sive racist utterances. For this reason, it is difficult for the U.S. to accept
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,9 3 which requires signatory states to punish "all dissemi-
nation of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred [and] incitement to
racial discrimination. . ...94
It is unlikely that a post-apartheid South Africa will be able to simi-
larly tolerate free speech. The National Party government has so greatly
restricted freedom of expression 9 5 that this fundamental principle is vir-
tually unknown to generations of South Africans. Furthermore, blacks
have been subjected to racial abuse 9 6 for so long that there is an under-
standable desire to outlaw racial abuse and the propagation of racist ide-
ologies. Accordingly, the ANC Guidelines, while reaffirming freedom of
expression, provide that "the advocacy or practice of racism, fascism,
naziism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred
shall be outlawed."'9 7
The freedom of speech clause in the Law Commission's draft bill
does not address the potential problem of citizens using their right to
89. A. SACHS, supra note 44, at 20.
90. Id. at 27.
91. CoNsrrrtIoNAL GUIDELINES, supra note 66, para.j, at 131.
92. Id. para. u, at 132.
93. For consideration of this topic, see R. IaLLICH & F. NEwMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAw AND POLICY 166-70 (1979).
94. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, supra note 83, art. 4(a), at 220.
95. For a survey of these restrictions, see J. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 146-202.
96. South African law prohibits statements that engender feelings of hostility
between the races. See id. at 177-78. Although these laws have been used to suppress
expression of black grievances against white rule, they have seldom been invoked to
punish white racist abuse of blacks.
97. CONSTrrTIOrAL GUIDELINES, supra note 66, para. k, at 131.
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free speech to advocate racist ideas. It simply recognizes "[tihe right to
freedom of speech and to obtain and disseminate information. "9 8
While this provision may appeal to western libertarian sentiments, it
fails to consider the realities of South Africa. Moreover, because South
Africa's acceptance into the international community and accession to
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination will inevitably require overwhelming evidence of South
Africa's determination to unequivocally renounce apartheid, a bill of
rights that does not outlaw the public propagation of racist ideology and
sentiment would only act as an obstacle in South Africa's path toward
international credibility.
D. Group Rights Versus Individual Rights
The most controversial aspect of the current debate over a South Afri-
can bill of rights is whether the bill should protect individual rights or
group rights. The National Party government has opposed the protec-
tion of individual rights on grounds of both political ideology and reli-
gious conviction. 9 9 Rather, the National Party has supported group
rights which may be invoked to entrench the interests of minority
groups, particularly the Afrikaner group. 10 0
The Law Commission's Working Paper rejected the National Party's
reasoning and refused to jurisprudentially rationalize the recognition
and protection of Afrikaner rights. Instead, after thoroughly examining
the protection of group rights under international law and foreign legal
systems, the Commission concluded that the interests of members of
groups - such as their rights to culture, language, and religion -
should be protected as individual rights.' 0 ' Because South African law
does not recognize racial or ethnic groups as legal personae entitled to
standing before the courts, the Commission found that cultural, reli-
gious, and linguistic interests were individual rights, to be protected
from arbitrary legislative and executive infringement through court pro-
ceedings.' 0 2 The Law Commission protects individuals as members of a
group and not groups.' 0 3
98. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 8, at 472.
99. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
100. The fact that protection of group rights serves the interests of the politically
powerful minority explains why the National Party government charged the Law
Commission with examining the protection of both individual and group rights.
I01. The Commission recognizes "[tihe right of every person, individually or
together with others, freely to practise his culture and religion and use his language."
WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 21, at 474.
102. Id at 388, 392-95, 408-10. The draft bill recognizes "[t]he right of every
person to be safeguarded from discrimination against his culture, religion or lan-
guage .... Id. art. 22, at 475.
103. The Law Commission follows the example of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, per-
sons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community
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The Law Commission does, however, attempt to appease the advo-
cates of group rights by recognizing:
The right of every person or group to disassociate himself or itself from
other individuals or groups: Provided that if such disassociation consti-
tutes discrimination on the ground of race, colour, religion, language or
culture, no public or state funds shall be granted directly or indirectly to
promote the interests of the person who or group which so
discriminates.10 4
This is an unfortunate provision as it will give approval to racially exclu-
sive dubs, schools, and suburbs. It will inevitably lead to litigation as its
opponents challenge its compatibility with article 2's prohibition on
racial discrimination. More important, this provision will be seen as a
means of maintaining white privilege, and it therefore has no place in a
bill of rights that aims to advance the cause of non-racialism in South
Africa.
The Law Commission correctly concludes that the political rights of
minority groups should be secured by a constitutional compact rather
than a bill of rights. If the white group or any other minority group
wishes to secure political equality or preferential treatment in a new
constitutional arrangement, it will have to do so through such devices as
a minority veto on legislation or the adoption of federal units drawn in
accordance with racial classification. But because the ANC rejects any
suggestion of ethnicity in constitutional planning,105 it seems unlikely
that a new constitution for South Africa would incorporate such an
arrangement. 10 6 Indeed, it was possibly the National Party govern-
ment's awareness of this problem that prompted it to seek to introduce
political protection for Afrikaner rights into a bill of rights. Fortunately,
the Law Commission has rejected this stratagem. Indeed, it is largely
the Commission's refusal to protect group political rights, together with
the recognition of the franchise as a basic right, that has lent credibility
to the Working Paper.
E. Emergency Powers
South Africa has lived under a state of emergency since 1985.107 Over
40,000 persons have been detained without trial, the media has been
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 83, art. 27.
104. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 17, at 474.
105. The ANC Guidelines declare that "constitutional protection for group rights
would perpetuate the status quo and would mean that the mass of the people would
continue to be constitutionally trapped in poverty and remain as outsiders in the land
of their birth." CoNsrrrtoNAt GUIDELINES, supra note 66, at 130.
106. For an examination of the various constitutional forms and models for a new
South Africa that are currently the subject of debate, see Dugard, The Quest for a Lib-
eral Democracy in South Africa, [1987] AcrA JURIDICA 237.
107. Public Safety Act, No. 3 of 1953, § 2 STAT. REPUB. S. ArR. - CRIMINAL LAw AND
PROCEDURE at 191 (Butterworths) (empowering the State President to declare a state
of emergency).
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muzzled, political organizations have been proscribed, meetings have
been banned, and the security forces have ruled the land.' 0 8 To the
north, many of South Africa's neighbors continue to live under emer-
gency powers that have become the rule rather than the exception.
Therefore, many South Africans fear that the government could devalue
a bill of rights by declaring a state of emergency and suspending the
provisions of the bill.
It would be naive to believe that circumstances will not arise in a
post-apartheid South Africa that would warrant declaration of emer-
gency powers and the suspension of some rights. A bill of rights must
therefore anticipate such a crisis and regulate the extent to which the
government may suspend the bill's provisions in an emergency.' 0 9
Because of the importance of precisely limiting the government's ability
to suspend rights during an emergency, the Law Commission's treat-
ment of derogation of rights is largely unsatisfactory. "0 First, it fails to
acknowledge that certain rights, notably the freedom from torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, may never be suspended." 1
Secondly, it confers wide discretion on the legislature to derogate rights
by providing:
The rights granted in this Bill may by legislation be limited to the extent
that is reasonably necessary in the interests of the security of the state, the
public order, the public interest, good morals, public health, the adminis-
tration of justice, the rights of others or for the prevention of disorder
and crime, but only in such measure and in such a manner as is acceptable
in a democratic society. 112
Although the draft bill suffers from these shortcomings, the Com-
mission introduced a radical innovation that partially restricts the gov-
ernment's ability to suspend the bill of rights. By extending the power
of judicial review to article 30, the Commission grants the courts the
power to review the executive's decision to declare a state of emer-
gency. 3 In practice, courts would probably allow the executive wide
108. See DEVELOPMENTS IN EMERGENCY LAW (N. Haysom & C. Plaskett eds. 1989).
109. See, e.g., BOTSWANA CONST. §§ 16, 17 (providing in its bill of rights for deroga-
tion of rights upon declaration of a state of emergency); INDIA CONST. § 359 (provid-
ing for derogation of rights upon state of emergency).
Likewise, international human rights conventions recognize the right of signatory
states to derogate from their obligations during times of declared emergency. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 83, art. 4, at 59;
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 80, art. 15, at 232-34.
110. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 30, at 479.
111. Many international human rights conventions contain such limitations on a
state's power to derogate rights in times of emergency. See International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 83, art. 4(2), at 59; European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 80, art. 15(2), at 232.
112. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 30, at 479.
113. Id. art. 31. This power ofjudicial review extends beyond present South Afri-
can law, which places the decision to declare an emergency beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts. See Stanton v. Minister ofJustice, 1960 (3) S. Ar. L. Rep. 354 (Transvaal
Provincial Div.). Article 31 also extends beyond the jurisprudence of most foreign
legal systems. According to the International Commission of Jurists' comparative
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discretion on decisions taken in times of political crisis.114 Neverthe-
less, the power of judicial review of a declaration of emergency warns
the executive that its powers during a national emergency are not unlim-
ited and may therefore act as a restraint on the abuse of power.
F. Economic Policy and Property Rights
It is generally agreed that regulation of economic policy is a legislative
rather than a judicial function. 115 "[A] constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory." 116 Afortiori, it is not the func-
tion of a bill of rights to lay down a particular economic policy, be it
socialist or capitalist. However, in article 14 of its draft bill, the Law
Commission recognizes: "The right freely and on an equal footing to
engage in economic intercourse, which shall include the capacity to
establish and maintain commercial undertakings, to procure property
and means of production, to offer services against remuneration and to
make a profit."' " 7 Although the Commission intended this provision to
free black entrepreneurs from the shackles of economic apartheid,1 8 it
has inevitably been construed as an attempt to provide constitutional
backing for an economic policy of free enterprise. This will be unac-
ceptable to the ANC which, in its Guidelines, declares that the state shall
ensure that the entire economy serves the interests and well-being of all
sections of the population and that "[tihe economy shall be a mixed
one, with a public sector, a private sector, a co-operative sector and a
small-scale family sector."1 19 Moreover, article 14 will lead to endless
litigation and bring the courts into the same type of confrontation with
the legislature as that experienced by the U.S. Supreme Court during its
period of substantive due process. 120
study on emergency powers "it is widely thought that the executive and legislature,
the political branches of government, are entitled to discretion in determining the
existence and gravity of a threat to the nation, i.e., the need for a state of emergency,
and the necessity for recourse to specific emergency measures." INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION ON JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
435 (1983). This power is, however, in line with article 15 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which has been interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights to allow the court to pronounce on a signatory state's decision to declare an
emergency. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 78 (1978),
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 680, 707 (1978).
114. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding as con-
stitutional an executive order that excluded persons of Japanese ancestry from a
West Coast military area). See generally Dugard, TheJudiciary in a State of National Crisis
- With Special Reference to the South African Experience, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 477
(1987).
115. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, Sup. CT. REV. 34 (1962).
116. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
117. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 14, at 473.
118. See id. at 464.
119. CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 66, para. a at 130.
120. See, e.g., Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also P. MURPHY, supra note 81, at 128-69.
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Although a bill of rights should not entrench a particular economic
theory, it may be used to protect property rights. 12 1 Consistent with the
free market principles underlying the draft bill, the Law Commission
included a provision that recognizes: "The right to private property pro-
vided that legislation may in the public interest authorize expropriation
against payment of reasonable compensation which shall in the event of
a dispute be determined by a court of law."' 2 2 This provision is uncon-
troversial regarding personal property, as the ANC Guidelines declare
that "[piroperty for personal use and consumption shall be constitution-
ally protected."' 23
However, the dispute over protection of property held for produc-
tion is much more controversial and is likely to pose greater problems.
It is this property that a post-apartheid South African government might
expropriate to achieve a more equitable distribution of land and wealth.
But requiring reasonable compensation under a bill of rights would
prove a difficult, if not insurmountable, obstacle. Despite this obstacle,
any post-apartheid South African government must seriously consider
rectifying a system in which "85% of the land and probably 95% of pro-
ductive capacity is in the hands of the white minority.' 124 Thus, a bill of
rights that truly addresses the South African experience should establish
a system of protecting real property rights that takes steps to rectify
these inequalities, not preserve them. 12 5
G. Social and Economic Rights
The South African debate on whether to include social and economic
rights in a bill of rights follows the traditional pattern. On the one hand,
some argue that these second generation rights126 should not be
included in a bill of rights because they are non-justiciable. Taking this
view, Mr. Justice J. M. Didcott, one of South Africa's foremost liberal
judges, declares:
A bill of rights is not a political manifesto, a political programme. Primar-
ily, it is a protective device. It is a shield, in other words, rather than a
121. See African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted on June 27, 1981,
Organization of African Unity, art. 14, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59, 61 (1982) ("[t]he right
to property shall be guaranteed"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
60, art. 17(2), at 74 ([nio one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property"). Compare
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 60
(silent on this right) with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 83 (same); and European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 80 (same).
122. WoRKING PAPER, supra note 57, art. 15, at 473.
123. CONSITrrIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 66, para. t, at 132.
124. A. SACHS, supra note 44, at 18.
125. Id
126. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 60, arts. 6-15, at 50-51 (recognizing, inter alia, the rights to work, to social secur-
ity, to protection of the family, to an adequate standard of living, to the enjoyment of
health, to education, and to take part in cultural life); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 60, arts. 22-27, at 75-77 (recognizing similar second gener-
ation rights).
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sword, it can state, effectively and quite easily, what may not be done. It
cannot stipulate, with equal ease or effectiveness, what shall be done.
The reason is not only that the courts, its enforcers, lack the expertise and
the infrastructure to get into the business of legislation or administration.
It is also, and more tellingly, that they cannot raise the money.127
The Law Commission endorses this approach to second generation
rights. 12 8
On the other hand, others insist that South Africa should break with
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of restricting a bill of rights to include only
justiciable rights. They argue that the South African instrument should
seek to advance not only second generation rights but also third genera-
tion rights, such as the rights to peace, development, and a dean envi-
ronment. 129 The ANC Guidelines endorse this approach.' 30
A potential solution to this controversy is suggested by the Indian
constitution of 1949, which distinguishes between judicially enforceable
civil and political rights' 8 ' and nonjusticiable second and third genera-
tion rights that are "nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the
country"'132 and are to be honoured by the state in law making. There-
fore, while a South African bill of rights should focus onjusticiable first
generation rights, it should be accompanied by a non-justiciable declara-
tion embodying rights such as those contained in the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966.133 This
declaration might direct the legislature in its law making function and
could serve as an interpretive guide to the bill of rights.
H. Judicial Review
In South Africa, blacks are largely excluded from the judicial system.'8 4
Although South African law does not prohibit the appointment of black
judges, none have as yet been appointed. The reason for this is twofold.
127. Didcott, Practical Workings of a Bill of Rights, in A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH
AFRICA: PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOsIUM HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA ON 1 AND
2 MAY 1986 52, 58 (1. van der Westhuizen & H. Viljoen eds. 1988).
128. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, at 416-29. The Commission concludes
that socio-economic rights should be protected in a bill of rights from legislative and
executive infringement, but such a bill should not place positive obligations on the
state. IM at 429.
129. See, e.g., A. SACHS, supra note 44, at 19. Accord African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 121, arts. 15-24 at 61-63.
130. Articlej obliges the state "to take active steps to eradicate, speedily, the eco-
nomic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination." CONSTITUTIONAL
GUIDELINES, supra note 66, art. j, at 131. Article I places the state under a "duty to
protect the right to work, and guarantee education and social security." Idr art. 1.
131. INDIA CONST. § 32.
132. Id § 37.
133. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 60.
134. The Supreme Court of South Africa consists of nine regional divisions and
one appellate division. There are approximately 115 Supreme Court judges and fif-
teen judges of appeal. All judges on the Supreme Court are white and there is only
one woman judge. For a description of the South African court structure, see J.
DUGARD, supra note 3, at 10-13.
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First, like England, South Africa has a divided bar and judges are
appointed from the ranks of the senior barristers. At present there are
only three black senior barristers.13 5 Second, many blacks would
decline to accept appointment to the bench as they are unwilling to
apply the laws of apartheid.1 36 This exclusion of blacks from thejudicial
system combined with the fact that the South African judiciary has often
displayed a pro-executive approach to the interpretation of race and
security laws has resulted in a growing loss of confidence in the
courts. 137
These problems have provoked controversy over whether the pres-
ent South African Supreme Court would be an appropriate guardian of a
bill of rights. Most supporters of a bill of rights favor the Supreme
Court,' 3 8 but others argue for a special constitutional court, similar to
that of West Germany,' 3 9 or an extra-judicial commission of a quasi-
political nature. 140 The ANC Guidelines's silence on the subject ofjudi-
cial review suggests not only that the ANC has no confidence in the
existing judicial system but also that it does not envisage enforcement of
a bill of rights by courts of law.
The Law Commission ignores these widespread misgivings about
the present judiciary's impartiality on matters affecting race and security
and the competence of judges inexperienced in judicial review to moni-
tor a bill of rights. It recommends that the existing judiciary be
entrusted with the task of enforcing a bill of rights on the grounds that
"[t]he public has a large measure of confidence in the courts it already
knows"'14 1 and that there is a danger that a "constitutional court will be
distrusted as a loaded or political court."' 4 2
The Law Commission's reliance on the present South African judi-
ciary may be well founded for there are some recent indications that the
judiciary is becoming more responsive to human rights issues. In 1989,
Mr. Justice M. M. Corbett was appointed as Chief Justice of South
Africa. A man of liberal outlook, he has a much better human rights
record than many of his predecessors. There is therefore some hope
that the public will regain some confidence in the judiciary during Chief
Justice Corbett's period in office. If this occurs, it will overcome the
135. See Mokgatle, The Exclusion of Blacks from the South African Judicial System, 3 S.
AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 44, 46-47 (1987).
136. See itd at 48.
137. See generally J. DUGARD, supra note 3, at 279-388.
138. See, e.g., Didcott, supra note 127, at 53-54.
139. A constitutional court has a twofold attraction. First, it might consist of
experts in constitutional law and human rights. Secondly, it would be easier to con-
stitute a new court representing all sections of the community rather than to wait
until black lawyers become eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court.
140. Sachs pleads for a commission that is democratic in its "composition, func-
tioning and perspective, and that operate[s] under overall supervision of the people's
representatives in Parliament." A. SACHS, supra note 44, at 22.
141. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, at 449.
142. Id
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principal objection to the present judiciary as the custodian of a bill of
rights.
The other objection, however, will be more difficult to surmount.
Professor Cappelletti has argued that the role of constitutional review
"demands a higher sense of discretion than the task of interpreting ordi-
nary statutes"143 and that "the bulk of Europe's judiciary seems psycho-
logically incapable of the value-oriented quasi-political functions
involved in judicial review." 144 This comment is a particularly apt
description of the South African judiciary's approach towards constitu-
tional litigation. Clearly, the judiciary will have to be re-educated before
it assumes the role of custodian of a bill of rights.
I. Enactment of the Law: Merits of a Limited Bill of Rights in
Anticipation of a New South African Constitution
" Perhaps the most vigorously contested question in the debate over a
'South African bill of rights concerns the question of how and when to
introduce the instrument. One school argues that a bill of rights should
be included as a part of a constitutional compact for a post-apartheid
South Africa and, therefore, should be delayed until a consensus exists
on the form of the new constitutional order. This position probably has
the most popular support, as there is widespread apprehension that any
attempt to introduce a bill of rights before apartheid itself is completely
abandoned will bring the legitimacy of the instrument into question. Dr.
Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, a prominent liberal and former leader of the
opposition party in the white House of Assembly, has said "it would be
disastrous to introduce a Bill of Rights in the present South African con-
stitutional set-up, or, for that matter, as long as racist laws remain on the
statute books and political participation is predetermined on the basis of
racial or ethnic membership."'145 The Law Commission endorses this
view 146 and suggests a five stage process for implementing a bill of
rights. The Commission recommends that as soon as possible Parlia-
ment should meet in joint session and adopt a non-binding policy state-
ment in which it approves the principle of including a bill of rights in a
future constitution. 147 Parliament should then repeal all laws clearly
inconsistent with the likely provisions of a bill of rights. 148 Simultane-
ously, the government should launch a concerted educational program
to inform the general public of the advantages of a bill of rights. 149
Next, negotiation and constitutional planning committees should draft a
bill of rights as part of a new political order.150 For the final phase, the
143. M. CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 63 (1971).
144. Id. at 62-63.
145. WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, at 281 (quoting Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert, for-
mer leader of the opposition).
146. See id. at 487-91.
147. See id. at 488.
148. See id at 488-89.
149. See id. at 489-90.
150. See id. at 490.
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Law Commission recommends that the proposed constitution, including
a bill of rights, be put to a single, general open referendum. Thus, the
constitution would be legitimized by an unrestricted electorate that does
not discriminate among voters from particular groups or races. 15 1
Albie Sachs advances a more radical reason for postponing the
introduction of a bill of rights until South Africa totally abandons
apartheid. Sachs argues that a bill of rights can only be adopted by the
former oppressed people after they have won freedom, and not by "a
certain stratum in the ranks of the oppressors." 1 5 2 In support of his
argument he invokes the U.S. Bill of Rights, which "was adopted not
before Independence, but afterwards, not by the ousted colonial author-
ities but by the victorious freedom fighters."' 53
Although some bills of rights have not emerged as a consequence of
successful armed struggle, 15 there is certainly considerable historical
support for Sachs's view. Moreover, many of the black community's sus-
picions about a bill of rights arise from the fact that its main proponents
are found among liberal whites. But to identify such whites as belonging
to "a certain stratum within the ranks of the oppressors" is an unfair slur
on the liberals who, for over forty years, have been in the vanguard of
non-violent opposition to apartheid.
Opposed to this view, another school believes that many years will
pass before the various political factions and racial communities in
South Africa can agree on a constitution that fully recognizes the princi-
ple of universal franchise. In the interim, this school would introduce a
limited bill of rights and exploit the present momentum in favour of a
bill of rights.
The model for a limited bill of rights is the 1960 Canadian Bill of
Rights,' 5 5 which was the precursor to the 1982 Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. An ordinary statute that recognized the main civil and polit-
ical rights, 156 this Bill of Rights was not a "higher law" like the U.S. Bill
of Rights. The judiciary did not have the power to overrule offensive
legislation. Instead, judges construed legislation so that it did not
abridge or infringe any of the protected rights unless Parliament
expressly sanctioned such violations.' 5 7 In practice, this power of con-
struction allowed the courts to strike down contrary legislation enacted
before the adoption of the Bill.' 58 Although Parliament could override
151. See id at 490-91.
152. A. SACHS, supra note 44, at 3. See also WORKING PAPER, supra note 57, at 7-11.
153. A. SACHS, supra note 44, at 8.
154. See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 82; An Act for
the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Act of
Aug. 10, 1960, Can. Stat. 519 [hereinafter 1960, Canadian Bill of Rights].
155. 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note 154.
156. See Hogg, A Comparison of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with the
Canadian Bill of Rights, in CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 1-23 (W.
Tarnopolsky & G. Beaudoin eds. 1982).
157. 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note 154, art. 2.
158. See, e.g., Regina v. Drybones, 9 D.L.R.3d 473, 483-85 (1969).
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the Bill of Rights, the Minister of Justice was required to alert Parlia-
ment to any inconsistencies between proposed new legislation and the
Bill of Rights. 159 Undoubtedly, this acted as a major political restraint
on Parliament.
In the South African context, a limited bill of rights would work in
the same manner. It would contain all the basic civil and political rights
except the universal right to the franchise, which would not be granted
until adoption of a full bill of rights and a new South African constitu-
tion. The limited bill of rights would be an ordinary statute, capable of
Parliamentary override only after Parliament had considered a report
from the Minister of'Justice indicating any conflict with the bill of rights.
The courts would be empowered to set aside earlier statutes that violate
the limited bill of rights including laws comprising the law of apartheid.
The single exception would be the present constitution and its discrimi-
natory provisions relating to the franchise. The courts would also be
directed to construe any ambiguous statute, whether enacted before or
after the bill, consistently with the bill of rights.
The limited bill of rights would remain in force until South Africa
adopts a new constitution that would include a comprehensive bill of
rights, including the universal right to the franchise. The full bill of
rights would become part of the higher law of the constitution and
would confer the power ofjudicial review. A limited bill of rights opera-
tive during the transitional period is expected to serve several purposes.
First, it would facilitate the removal of racist and repressive laws from
the South African statute book. Second, the limited bill of rights would
contribute towards the creation of a rights culture in a country that has
largely ignored human rights until now. Third, the limited bill would
educate a judiciary trained in a system of parliamentary supremacy to
exercise judicial review over acts of Parliament.' 60 Fourth, it would
restore confidence in the courts and the legal system, and finally, the
limited bill would create a political environment more conducive to
negotiation and resolution.
Conclusion
Human rights are at last on the South African political agenda.
Although the National Party government and the popular black political
movements continue to disagree in many areas, there is now a consen-
sus that human rights should play a central role in the political order
159. 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note 154, art. 3.
160. The South African judiciary faces the same problems as the Canadian judici-
ary faced when the Canadian Bill of Rights was introduced. South African judges
have been educated in a system in which legal positivism and respect for parliamen-
tary supremacy are the guiding principles ofjudicial conduct. Clearly the judiciary
will have to adopt a more activist, value-oriented approach to its role if it is to suc-
ceed as a custodian of a bill of rights. For discussion of the experience of the Cana-
dian judiciary, see Fowler, The Canadian Bill of Rights - A Compromise Between
Parliamentary and Judicial Supremacy, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 712, 733-38 (1973).
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that is to emerge from the negotiations for a new South Africa. The
South African Law Commission's Working Paper has at least elevated the
issue of human rights to the center of the political debate.
